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THE SCIENCE OF

LINGUISTIC LAISSER-ALLER
Louis Foley
Those of us who are unapologetically devoted to the cause of
correct English are not necessarily so hopelessly oldfogyish as some
of the "scientific" popularizers of linguistics take us to be. We are
not harking back to any imaginary "good old days." Some of us
would say unhesitatingly that the best English of today, all things
considered, is the best there ever was. We are not disposed, how
ever, to accept blithely on the ground of "usage" just any sort of
careless confusion or ignorant corruption merely because it has con
siderable currency. Indeed, one may well contend that there is less
excuse for such things now than ever before.

A favorite method of argument of those who espouse the blind
worship of "usage" is to becloud the issue by confronting us with
a mixed batch of specimens involving indiscriminately various sorts
of things. Along with errors of ancient date which only the most
pedantic-minded would fight against now, they include flagrant
examples of slipshod confusion and muddled thinking.

They will, for instance, take a good deal of trouble to defend
saying "It's me" which is surely one of the least offensive of com
mon corruptions. 1 It seems trivial compared to the final establish
ment of you as a nominative, which took place long ago. Any reader
of the King James Bible must know that in the older language the
subject pronoun was ye, and you was used only for the object. So
from a historical point of view, "You went" is no better than "Him
and me went." Also you was always plural in meaning, and naturally
was not used in addressing a single person. Now, except in the con
servative style of traditional ecclesiastical forms and old-fashioned

poetry, we have completely lost the second-person singular pronouns,
thou, thy, and thee. (Insofar as thee persists in Quaker dialect, it is
used with utter disregard for grammar, as in "Thee does.") Thus
modern English is no longer capable of expressing, by the actual
words, the very real difference in attitude between intimate familiarity
and formal address, as other languages easily do.
These changes have irrevocably taken place. They have come
to seem perfectly "natural," and no one would seriously contemplate
1. e.g., Robert P. Price, "Who's There? It's Me," The Torch, July 1956.
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trying to undo them. Such things could happen when our language
was in a state of flux, when the bars were completely down, and

when scholarly people who wrote in Latin despised English anyhow.
In our day of widespread communication, of general literacy, and
of much-vaunted education, there is nothing like the same excuse

for allowing ignorance or sloppiness to triumph unhindered.
It is really a rather curious state of affairs when "new scientific
principles" are mentioned in the same breath with saying that "Eng
lish teachers and scholars ... no longer regard such locutions as ain't,
can't hardly, to please sit down, these kind of, the reason is because,
and can I have a cookie? as unforgivable crimes."2 This collection
of examples is indeed a mixed kettle of fish, going all the way from
what everyone knows is incorrect to what never was really wrong at all.
Theoretical defense of ain't as a contraction of am not has not

much to do with reality. For one thing, elisions have shifted with the

passing of time. Just as the 'tis of our ancestors has change to it's,
so we now naturally say I'm not. This, however, is not the real point.
It is perfectly clear that the typical ain't-user employs the word as an
all-purpose negative for all persons, singular or plural, with all verbs.
It serves not only for past and present, but with "gonnuh" takes care
of all negatives in future tense. So it is an unmatchable example of
indiscriminate substitution for all manner of proper forms. Going

along regularly with all sorts of other crudities, it is the "classic"
example of the most shiftless speech, which it inevitably suggests.
Of course, just because it is so obviously bad English, it may be "fun"
to use when you know that people know it is not your natural way
of talking!

Other items in the list display lack of regard for exactness in

expression, but the last-named involves no question of grammar at
all. As a fixed formula of politeness, "May I?" simply preserved the
older verb may which has been generally replaced by can. The polite
ness is in the implication of authority in the person addressed; with
out his permission, you can't. No one need be particularly shocked
by the mere translation of a fossil formula into more modern idiom.
For anyone acquainted with the background of present-day

English, it is no secret that here and there certain forms, made possible
only by ignorance, crept in and were finally established. We know,
for instance, that "pea" became settled as an artificial singular because

pease sounded like a plural. Similar misunderstandings have fared
2.

ibid.
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variously. Though generally forgotten now, a generation or two ago
it was not uncommon to hear country folk refer to a dead body as
a "corp" because corpse sounded plural to them. "Shay," as in "the
one-hoss shay," a corruption of chaise, is now well-nigh sunk from
sight with the passing of horse-drawn vehicles, and other examples
have perished along the way. Agenda originally meant "things that
must be done," and opera was the Latin plural of opus, but these
words were fixed in their modern singular meanings before becoming
really current in English.
From one point of view, such instances simply demonstrate what
the really basic "usage" is—the system which makes any language what
it is, and which a person having a natural feeling for the language
follows instinctively. Only by some education does he become aware
of exceptions and the reasons for them. In our time, however, there
is surely no longer the extenuation there might once have been for
not distinguishing medium—media, criterion—criteria, phenomenon—
phenomena, stratum—-strata, or datum—data.

"Usage" is an indispensable support of language, but it is not
everything. As our means of expression have slowly and painfully
evolved through centuries, the real progress that has been made has
been always in the direction of precision, of straight thinking, of
discrimination, of recognizing finer distinctions. What makes bad
English bad is differences of quality which are not difficult to demon
strate. Essentially it is the result of insensitiveness to anything but
the grossest differences between ideas; in various degrees it indicates
a lack of the mental discipline which we might legitimately expect
of an intelligent person who has had the benefit of some education.
As an example of what he calls "use of like as a conjunction,"
Dr. Bergen Evans quotes a sentence from Anita Loos's Gentlemen
Prefer Blondes "Life is hard for a girl like I." Of course he under
stood that the girl's remark was meant to be "sub-standard" to show

her as "an uneducated person," but he seems to misinterpret the
implication. It is rather absurd to speak of "implying the suppressed
am [which] makes this like a conjunction."3 Not much detective

insight is required to see how the satire was intended. Her thoughtpattern was employing like as a preposition all right enough. Being
her simple self she would have said "like me," as anyone naturally
does. She translates it to the ridiculously unidiomatic / because in
her shallow-mindedness she takes that to sound more "refined." She

3. Address before Managing Editors of the Associated Press, 1963.
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had dimly grasped that, for instance, "He and I went" is more
respectable than the "Him and me went" which remains perennially
current on the lowest levels of speech. So she supposes that "I" is a
fancier substitute for me just about anywhere. She is putting on airs
in the same crude way as those who say, "They invited he and I,"

though they would never say, "They invited I." What makes her
talk amusing is that in her simple-minded affectation she distorts
the idiom so unnaturally.

This reminds me of one time years ago when I was introduced

to a young lady at a public dance. She was attractive in appearance,
and had an air of poised assurance. To make conversation, I asked
her if she had been present at a certain event of not long before,
"Were you there?" Quite seriously she replied, "Yes, I were." The
obvious deduction is irresistible. No doubt, in her customary environ

ment, people used was in all cases: "we was," "you was," "they
was." She had been around enough to sense that were had somehow

a higher social tone. So, when you found yourself with a "were"
person, the trick to show that you really belonged was just to sub
stitute were wherever you would say was. She was a true blood-sister
of the preferred blonde.

The typical kinds of error in grammar have been being made
generation after generation for a long time. Yet it would surely
be stultifying to claim that centuries of "usage" have made them
correct. Characteristically they show the sort of fumbling that hap

pens when a statement is not clearly conceived from the beginning
as a coherent whole. And certainly there is nothing particularly
American about such confusions.

Just for an off-hand example, Daniel Defoe in Roxana (1724)
had the lady saying "there was none to dine but he and I," "jesting
between her and I," "discourses which happened between my maid
Amy and I." James Boswell in his London Journal, a. generation
later, spoke of "a day eagerly expected by Dempster, Erskine, and I."
Certain ways of muddling sentence-structure which are weari
somely common in modern journalism were fully exemplified in the
reign of Queen Anne by Joseph Addison, the outstanding writer of
that much-praised Augustan age of English prose. In The Spectator
for July 20, 1711, he wrote: "My worthy friend Sir Roger is one
of those who is not only at peace within himself, but beloved and
esteemed by all about him." Immediately forgetting the false start
"of those," he finished the sentence as if the phrase were not there.
All he really had in mind was "one who is," as the subsequent "him-
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self and "him" clearly show. Avoiding the clutter of unnecessary
words might have helped to keep in focus the plain thought: "Sir
Roger is not only at peace within himself . . ." Needless to say, it
is not a question of denigrating eighteenth-century prose. For its
time, some of it was wonderful, but even its best is no peerless model
for us to imitate now.

Everyone who has given the matter any thought must realize
that words are continually acquiring new meanings through natural
association of ideas. This process has been occurring since no one
knows when, and only more rapidly as time has gone on. It operates
in general through two different kinds of figure of speech, metaphor
and metonymy; we start calling something by the name of something
it seems to resemble or by that of something so closely connected
with it that one immediately suggests the other. The common every
day vocabulary also is continually changing like styles in clothing,
amusements, or household equipment. We forget the names of things
we no longer use, and without effort learn those of new styles and
new inventions. The elaborate terminology of mediaeval armor or

of falconry, for example, is probably now familiar to fewer people
than can easily speak Latin, and the working vocabularies of many
activities of only one or two generations ago are a completely dead
language for anyone living today. The new words of our own time—
as dictionary-publishers seem never to realize—are the last words
the average person who is in touch with current events ever thinks of
looking up.

The mere matter of development of new words, and new meanings
for old ones, has no necessary connection whatever with the question
of what is correct English. Many inevitable changes one may readily
accept or even welcome, and still object to expressions which represent
nothing but careless confusion, without which they could never arise.
We do not have to countenance the heedlessness which confuses

the opposite points of view of imply and infer. Comprise, which
goes along with comprehend, comprehensive, comprehensible, and
other words from the same root, stands for the idea of taking in,

including, or containing. In recent times a good many newspaper
writers have treated it as merely a somewhat fancier synonym for
compose, which represents the opposite idea of combining constituent
elements. How much miseducation has thus been perpetrated may
be seen in the 1964 Republican platform: ". . . Republican leadership
will move immediately to establish an international commission,
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comprised of individuals of high competence in NATO affairs . . ."4
Disinterested, meaning impartial, not influenced by hope of

personal gain, is carelessly assumed to be the same as "uninterested,"
whereas they are based on quite different senses of interest.
In the last few years we have been seeing tank-trucks used for
transporting oil and gasoline labeled "flammable." This truncation
of a well-established word was of course intended as an extra-fool

proof precaution to avoid all danger of confusion between our two
very different prefixes in-. The negative prefix of incapable, incom
petent, incongruous, or inconspicuous has nothing to do with the in
(as opposed to out) of inflammable, capable of being set on fire—of
carrying the flame in. With no risk of misunderstanding, we keep on
as before with the figurative use of inflammation or speak of being
"inflamed" with passion. "Flammable" simply adds to the inconsistency
of which English already had quite enough. And there would hardly
be any point in a label to say that something could not be set on fire!
Correct English is not, and never was, a matter of mere sub
servience to arbitrary "rules," as the proponents of permissiveness
blandly assume. For anyone having the true feeling for the language,
a correct expression will commonly be the simple and natural one,
rather than the cumbersome jargon of wordy affectation, such as the
ungrammatical use of "due to the fact that" instead of because, or
"prior to" instead of before.

"People often hurl at me the word permissive," says Dr. Bergen
Evans. "They say, 'You are permissive.' What do you mean 'per
missive'? There are 300 million who speak this language. What
am I to do? Club them all over the head?"

Now there should be no mystery about what "permissive" means.

It represents an attitude which, if we held to it consistently, would
simply eliminate any real teaching of English. It means cheerfully
accepting any kind of sloppy makeshift or ignorant confusion as
soon as a good many people seem to find it comfortable.

Among the "300 million" who use some kind of English—if there
are that many—naturally the language is used with all degrees of
skill or lack of it. In speech as in any other form of human activity,
there are those who value orderliness and clarity, who care for

precision and clear-cut distinctions, and those who couldn't care less.
The ways of the latter do not need to be taught; these are easily
acquired by just letting things go.
4. The National Observer, July 20, 1964.
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What is the real purpose of "teaching English" anyhow? Is it
supposed to be the inculcating in students of the idea that any sort
of crudity of expression is quite all right if a good many people use
it? There is no need to teach "sub-standard" English; every alert
person becomes sufficiently familiar with it in the process of growing
up. Instruction in that is amply provided by radio and television
programs and other media, as by the hit-or-miss conversation one can

hear at any time. What does need to be taught by precept and prac
tice is clear-cut thinking, decent respect for the honest meanings of
words.

"Actually," says Professor Price, "the scientific point of view
does not ask for a complete overthrow of tradition, but rather a
recognition that there are different kinds of English." Well, we

didn't think anyone was really advocating a "complete overthrow"
of all standards; rather it has been a matter of clouding the distinc
tions which they serve to mark. Common sense must enable anyone
to perceive that there are "different kinds of English." That they
exist would be recognized by many who could not reliably point out
exactly what it is that makes the difference. The harm that is done

by the "scientific" approach is in creating the impression that by
and large one kind is as good as another, that "usage" no matter how
careless or ignorant is the only thing that matters. To be sure, if one
pays close attention to "the fine print" of what the permissivists have

to say, it transpires now and then that their views are not quite so
extreme as appears at first. The general effect of their pronounce

ments, however, has been a softening of linguistic discipline, a weak
ening of decent standards which need to be upheld.
Commonly the people who are fond of talking about a "scientific"
approach to expression, as against what they consider arbitrary theory,
seem to regard "correctness" in English as a matter of artificially
imposed rules. They assume that teachers who try to inculcate cor
rect English spend their time making students memorize rules. Now

many of us who do believe in correctness found out a good while ago
that that was not the way to get it. You acquire a skill by working
at it and seeing "how the thing works." Then you do not need the
"rule," an abstract generalization which you could state anytime in
your own words if you wished. For anyone of reasonable intelligence

it is not difficult to see and to explain the differences between good
English and bad.

It is perfectly possible to be quite at ease in using good English,
or to teach it, without employing what Dr. Evans calls "horrendous
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words" such aspluperfect, future indicative, subjunctive, or nonrestrictive clause, just as one can get along very well without such Latinisms
as horrendous. The technical terms of grammatical nomenclature

are naturally meaningless until after one is quite familiar with the
things they stand for. They are merely convenient means of exact

expression for the person who goes beyond the mere use of language
to talking about language itself. For anyone educated to that point,
they precisely express relationships which could only be clumsily
described in any other way. As is well known, however, acquiring
precise vocabulary in any field of thought can sharpen one's per
ception of the ideas which the words represent.

It ismerely an arbitrary declaration to say that "rules of grammar"
are "usually simply half a dozen shibboleths that assert status."
Whether a person ever consciously learns "rules" or not, either in
the main he will conform to the system or else he will be incoherent
and unclear. In many situations, no doubt, he may manage to convey

simple ideas well enough for his purpose in spite of crudity and con
fusion in their expression. He will merely be adding gratuitous infor
mation about himself, his taste, his perceptiveness, his self-respect.

People who truly master good English, and habitually use it, must be
motivated by something more deeply a part of them than desire
for cheaply-won "status." They care for apt and graceful expression
with the same kind of feeling for orderliness that makes us like to see
cleanly-shaved faces, neatly-cornbed hair, well swept rooms, nouses

well built, gardens well tended, unlittered streets. They enjoy having
things done right. Along with whatever else, at bottom that feeling is
required for achieving what President Kirk of Columbia has called
the first quality of an educated man, the primary duty of a college
graduate, "clarity and precision in his spoken and written communication."5

Louis Foley is Professor of English at Babson Institute of Business
Administration in Massachusetts.

5. Commencement address at Bates College, reported in The Christian Science
Monitor, July 24, 1964.

